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I

Since few studies have explicitly focused on the impact
of China's one-child-family policy on Chinese women,

this

thesis is designed to explore this aspect. The implication of
the

policy

for

particularly its
labor roles,

both

urban

and

rural

influence on women's

and on social,

women

is

fertility

studied,
behavior,

heal th and family status.

The

2

focus of the study is to explore the changes of women's lives
associated with the one-child-family policy, and advantages
and disadvantages, even contradictions the policy has brought
to women's lives.
thesis

The
sources

a)

library

involves

descriptive

research,

statistical

data

utilizing
(e.g.,

as

Chinese

Population Yearbook; b) historical and interpretive research
(e.g., studies cited in the literature review section); and c)
media accounts

(e.g.,

Women of China,

a monthly magazine;

Beijing Review, a weekly magazine, and China Today, a monthly
magazine).
The

descriptive

data

analysis

shows

that

the

policy

benefits urban Chinese women more than it does women in the
countryside. This is mainly because most of the incentives,
such

as

space

for

housing,

wage

bonuses,

and

extended

maternity leaves, function effectively among urban women. In
contrast, these incentives turn out to have little appeal to
rural

families,

especially

rural

women.

What's

more,

the

associated disincentives seem to make rural women's lives even
harder. In addition, the deeply-rooted feudal ideas together
with the conflict between the policy and reality have put
rural women into a more difficult situation than urban women.
In short, the one-child-family policy is more threatening to
rural women than to urban women in China.
China needs to reduce its huge population. Women in China
need to improve their status at home as well as in society. Is

3

the one-child-family the best solution? The thesis concludes
with a discussion of this issue.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The

socialist

revolution

in

1949

was

accompanied

by

structural changes that began to upgrade the status of women
in China.

The Marriage Law of

1950 removed certain

legal

restrictions on women, and allowed further advances. The Law
not only abolished the feudal marriage and family system of
marriage based upon arbitrary decision by a third party, or on
mercenary

marriage,

but

also

put

into

effect

the

new

democratic marriage and family system based on the free choice
of partners, on monogamy, and on equal rights for both sexes
(Encyclopedia of China's Law). The Marriage Law was the first
law that the new People's Republic of China promulgated after
its founding in 1949 (Women of China, 1990), and it was the
first democratic marriage law in Chinese history. Before that,
the feudal patriarchal family system went hand in hand with
arranged

marriages,

male

women's wants and feelings.

chauvinism

and

indifference

to

In recent years, the government

has been carrying out the one-child-family policy, which, to
some extent, has helped improve the status of women even more.
Generally speaking, the single-child-family policy is one
of the most important new policies which have changed the face

2

of China since the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976. Its
implications for the future social structure and development
-·, 1,, ,:

of China are fundamental. The policy, inaugurated in 1979, had
its origins in the government's concern that if population
growth is not slowed down and eventually

reversed, China can
-

'

not achieve the economic growth for which it is striving.'
Therefore, since 1979, all couples of child bearing age have
been urged to limit their offspring to one child. In order to
realize this goal,

heavy political and social pressure has

been used and a vast set of incentives and disincentives has
been developed to reward those whol obey the national program
>1 J

and to penalize those who do not~-l~owever, since the policy
conflicts

sharply

with

traditional

Chinese

values

problematic in other ways, it is difficult to carry

and

is

out~

Its

success or failure will have far-reaching implications for the
economic,

social

Furthermore,

this

and

political

development

Chinese experiment

surely has

of

China.

important

implication for the nations throughout the world which are
undergoing

early

stages

of

urbanization

and

so

called

modernization, since rapid population expansion continues to
confront most such nations.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Of all the post-Mao population studies done on China so
far, most have focused on social and family structural changes

3

caused by the one-child-family policy, and on the influence of
the policy on China's economy and four modernizations. 1 Little
attempt has been made to examine the subtle but important
changes the policy has brought to the status of Chinese women.
Also lacking are comparisons of the effects of such changes on
urban and rural women in China.
thesis

is

to

examine the

Therefore the purpose of this

impact

of

China's

single-child-

family policy on Chinese women and the possibly differential
influence of the policy on rural and urban women. Descriptive
statistics will be used to illustrate the changes in women's
lives and more specifically the differential changes between
rural and urban women.

Special attention will be given to

changes in women's educational levels, employment status, and
their positions at home as well as in society. The thesis will
begin with historical background, followed by an explanation
of the family-planning policy. Then there will be an analysis
of

the

current

situation

of

collected from various sources,

Chinese

women,

using

data

to explore the advantages,

disadvantages, and major changes in

women's lives associated

with

policy.

China's

single-child-family

This

study

is

significant because the success or failure of the singlechild-family

policy

initiatives,

and

thus

the

future

development of China, rests heavily upon the evolving status

Four modernizations ref er to modernizations
industry, agriculture, defense and science.

in

4

of Chinese women, especially in regard to their childbearing
roles, and their acceptance or rejection of that status.

HYPOTHESES

Based on analysis of available data on the subject at
hand, two hypotheses are advanced:
1.
policy,

Since

the

changes

implementation

in women's

lives

of

the

one-child-family

in China have

occurred,

specifically:
a. Women's age at first marriage has increased;
b.

Years

spent

in

childbearing

and

child

rearing

have

decreased;
c. Social welfare for young mothers (of only one child) has
increased;
d.

The

percent

of

women

of

childbearing

age

who

use

contraceptives has increased.
2. The one-child-family policy benefits urban women much
more than it does women in the countryside.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

China

is

the

most

populous

country

on

earth,

with

approximately 1.2 billion people, over a fifth of the world's
i I. _/i
•
total population (Hou, 1991).
:overpopulation here, as
elsewhere,

is associated with serious

social and economic

problems:lTo use only 7% of the world's arable land to feed
,,--l

22% of the world's population is not an easy accomplishment
(Guo, 1990; Hou, 1991). Its average annual per capita gross
national product, which is equivalent to 400 U.S. dollars,
ranks China among the lowest income countries in the world
(Hou,

1991). Also,

there are 180 million (one-sixth of the

population) illiterate and semiliterate people in China, about
a

quarter of the world's total

(Hou,

1991).

In addition,

overpopulation impairs the development of China's industry,
medical care, and social welfare, as well as the quality of
women's lives.
Unfortunately, the leaders of China did not anticipate
the eventual problem of population when the People's Republic
'

-

~)

of China was established in 1949. In fact,

the leaders were

pronatalists, encouraging large families, in accordance with
the prevailing cultural norm that most of the leaders shared./

~

6
i

I ~/

~

Mao Zedong, for example, at one time encouraged the expansion
of China's population. He was not worried about the country's
having too many people, because, as he said, "Every stomach
comes with two hands attached" (Worden, 1988:117).
In the early

1950s,

economist

demographer,

Professor Ma

and

former

Yin-chu,

president

a

Chinese

of

Beijing

University, became convinced that China had to act seriously
to

control

the

rapid growth

of

the population.

He did a

thorough study of China's population and presented a theory of
population control. Mao Zedong, however, was not convinced of
the need for control. Instead he regarded Ma's suggestion as
a "bourgeois" Malthusian theory.

He believed that,

"Of all

things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the
leadership
people,

of

the

Communist

Party,

every kind of miracle

as

long

as

there

can be performed"

are

(Worden,

1988:123). He also believed that the Chinese masses were a
major component of the productive forces,

in fact the only

component that was in healthy condition after the 8-year war
with Japan and the 3-year Liberation War against Kuomindang.
In the mid 1960s,

the study of demography itself was

forbidden. For the following ten years almost no professional
work was done in the field of population studies.

Related

disciplines such as sociology and statistics had similar fate
(Li,

1962; Wong,

1979). This suspension of demographic and

related studies has had its costs. Basic information on the
population characteristics of that period is lacking today.

7

Few professional demographic researchers were available then,
and there were not enough library holdings of the necessary
demographic literature (Coale, 1981}. In 1978 there was only
one research institution on population in the whole country.
By 1981,

the number had been

increased to over 20

(Tien,

1981).
The neglect of the population issue is also indicated by
the lack of articles associated with this subject. (See Figure
1.)
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Figure 1.
Demographic Articles in Newspapers and
Journals (1950-1988). Source: The Journal of Asian
Studies Vol.49, No.4, Nov.1990, P809.

Nevertheless, China did have, beginning as early as 1956,
three population control campaigns before the implementation

8

of the one-child-family policy.
The first serious efforts to control population growth
occurred from 1956 to 1958 (China Today,

90).

By then,

the

rapid growth of population in China was recognized not only by
demographers in the West, but also by Mao. "We have this huge
population," he wrote in 1956. "It is a good thing,

but of

course it also has difficulties . . . . Steps must therefore be
taken to keep our population for a

long time at a

stable

level, say, of 600 million. A wide campaign of explanation and
proper help must be undertaken to achieve this aim" (Worden,
1988:123). Yet, the birth control drive made little progress
during the first campaign. The main reason was the lack of an
effective

field

organization

policies into action.

for

translating

the

Party's

There is no evidence that a national

birth control organization had evolved by the time the Great
Leap Forward 2 interrupted the effort in the spring of 1958
(Aird, 1990).
A second campaign for birth control began in 1962 under
Zhou En-lai, but it was disrupted during the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution 3 in 1966.
2

The Great Leap Forward: In 1958, Mao Zedong reverted to
his earlier idea that China's masses, fired by revolutionary
enthusiasm, could produce far more than they consumed. He
argued that both in agriculture and industry "miracles" of
production were possible. Therefore he called for three years
of all-out efforts to produce a "Great Leap Forward" all
across the land.
3

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution started in
1966 and lasted for 10 years. Its ostensible purpose was to
eliminate influences that Mao Zedong believed had corrupted

9

The third birth control campaign, again under Zhou, began
in 1970 and has continued to the present.

~

Generally speaking, state intervention in the internal
affairs of the family can be divided into 3 stages:
1.\Jn the 1950s and 1960s, the government had hoped to reduce
population growth by a series of voluntary measures, such as
education

campaigns

contraception.
fertility

Young

rather

than

and

encouragement

people
to

were

reduce

of

primarily
the

the
urged

population.

use
to

of
plan

Just

as

individuals and couples were encouraged to plan their work,
life, study and leisure, so they were encouraged to plan their
childbearing.

What was emphasized throughout the first stage

was that the decision to space and limit births was a private
family matter in which the individual couples themselves made
decisions according to their own personal circumstances and
wishes.)
2. In the 1970s, the hope that people would voluntarily limit
themselves had evolved into a series of agreements made at the
local level. That is,
allowed

to

negotiate

the urban and rural communities were
birth

quotas

with

their

resident

families. Actually the early 1970s marked the beginning of a
sustained attempt to implement family planning in China as
part of a national population policy to reduce the birth rate.

the Chinese Communist Party, but it was also an attempt by Mao
to regain full control of the Party organization by destroying
former colleagues who had attempted to limit his powers after
the disaster of the Great Leap Forward.

10
"Wan,

Xi,

slogan

Shao"

at

that

("late,
time.

spaced and
That

is,

few")

the

was

major

the popular

objective

was

reduction of fertility through later marriage, longer spacing
and

fewer

children

per

couple.

Program

performance

was

measured by the late marriage rate, the planned birth rate,
the

birth

limitation

rate,

live

birth

rate

and

natural

increase rate {Chen, 1985). The second campaign achieved more
success

than

the

first

one,

including

more

effective

contraceptive methods. Intrauterine devices and a new suction
device for carrying out abortion began to be put into use for
the first time. Yet both methods were available only in urban
areas (Aird, 1990).
3./By the end of the 1970s, however,

it had become clear to

the government leaders that family plans were too important to
be left open for local negotiation. According to statistics,
population in China had grown by more than 75% between 1949
and 1978 (from 540 million to more than 900 million ) (Smith,
1991). Although food grain production increased from 163.90
million tons in 1952 to 304.75 million tons in 1978 (Ishikawa,
1983}, the output of grain per capita actually dropped because
of the fast population growth. "Raising 600 million children
born since 1949 has required a total expenditure of l, 300
billion yuan -- roughly 30% of the total gross national income
over

that
4

same

period,"

said

Liu

Zheng

in

1982. 4

In

Liu Zheng is the director of the Population Research
Institute, Chinese People's University, and vice president of
China's Demographic Society.

f
!
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addition, two-thirds of the Chinese people would be under age
23 by 1984, with many years of healthy fertility before them.
Thus, China was faced with a demographic situation in which a
rapidly expanding population of childbearing age needed to be
called upon to accept drastic reduction in fertility. Even a
one-child-family policy would not stop the tide of population
growth in the short run.
Given this alarming situation, Chinese researchers and
planners

began

in

the

mid-1970s

limitation strategies and goals.

to

consider

new

family

Finally planners devised a

drastic program for reducing the Chinese population over the
course of the next century, which aimed at stabilizing the
population at about 700 million.
Beginning immediately,
drastically reduce the
average
birth rate to reach the final fertility
rate of one child per couple by 1985 and maintain
that level ... by 2070. That is, 90 years from now,
the total population should be stabilized at about
700 million ... maximum efforts [must] be made in
the next decade or two to advocate that all fertile
women must begin now. It will be like a relay race,
with each generation striving towards this goal. 5
Therefore when the Second Session of the Fifth National
People's

Congress

met

in

June,

1978,

the

question

of

population growth was discussed. The policy to encourage each
couple to have only one child was announced in January, 1979.
In September,
Committee)

the

following

year,

the

PCC

(Party Central

issued an "open letter" to call on all party and

5

See Liu Zheng and Song Jian, "China's Population:
Problems and Prospects", New World Press, Beijing, 1981, P31}

•

I
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youth
child.

league members to take the

lead

in having only one

Thus the government finally decided to take control of

individual family decision-making. And the "one-child-family"
policy had become a national goal.

CHAPTER III

THE ONE-CHILD-FAMILY POLICY

As early as 1968, when China's fertility level reached
its second highest peak since 1950, the total fertility rate
was 7.025 children per woman of completed reproductive age.
(The total fertility rate of women refers to the number of
times a woman gives birth in her life.)

In 1971,

when the

government started the third birth control campaign, the total
fertility rate was still a high 5.442 {Chen, 1985).

A decade

later in 1981, only two years after the application of the
one-child-family policy, the total fertility rate had dropped
to 2.238 {Chen, 1985).

Such a dramatic fertility transition
/

in a large country and in so short a time has surely not been
accomplished elsewhere to date. This achievement is even more
impressive because the transition has taken place without a
significant improvement in living standards or socio-economic
development

taking

place

before

or

during

the

transition

period (Chen, 1985).
Generally speaking, fertility reduction goes hand in hand
with an increase in modernization and urbanization. For most
societies, modernization precedes a significant fall in the
birthrate, mainly because it takes many decades of education
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and improved living conditions before families are convinced
it is in their best interest to limit their reproduction rate.
China's situation is really exceptional. In China, the birth
rate fell very rapidly before modernization. For example, in
1970, the birth rate was 33.59 per thousand, but it was 20.83
per

1,000

in

1989

(Beijing

Review,

1990).

If

we

compare

China's demographic statistics in 1985 with those in other
parts of the world (see Table I), we see that the birthrate is
lower than the world average and is approaching that of the
developed

countries

(although

it

is

Chinese demographers had expected).

still

not

as

low

as

In comparison to other

developing countries, China's birthrate is extremely low (20
as opposed to 35 per 1,000).
China's situation is exceptional also

because of the

reciprocal relationship between China's modernization and the
control of its population. To put it in another way, on the
one hand, the Chinese government hopes that the development of
modernization and urbanization will lead to the decline in
fertility. On the other hand, the government realized that the
very

development

of

modernization

depends

heavily

on

the

degree to which China can reduce its population growth rate.
In order to handle the dilemma of reducing population and
developing the economy, Chinese government finally decided to
use the dramatic strategy and tactic --- the one-child-family
campaign,

and has had authority to

rather effectively.

implement the strategy

15
TABLE I
CHINA'S BIRTHRATE --- COMPARISONS WITH
THE REST OF THE WORLD
1988
BIRTH RATE (PER 1,000)

REGION
CHINA

21

WORLD

28

DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

15

LESS DEV.(EXCL.CHINA)

35

JAPAN

11

SWEDEN

12

U.K.

13

CANADA

15

AUSTRALIA

15

u. s.

16

NEW ZEALAND

16

INDIA

33

HAITI

41

BANGLADESH

43

ETHIOPIA

46

MALI

50

Source: extracted from Population Reference Bureau,
1988, World Population Data Sheet (Washington D.C.;
Population Reference Bureau, Inc.

Although this campaign is widespread,
national
1980).

family

planning

law

(Davin,

there is no single

1985;

Renmin

Ribao,

The Fifth National People's Congress in 1980 expected

to issue a

national package,

with some standardization of

regulations, but it was unable to reach an agreement (Renmin

16

Ribao,

1980).

Thus the national program of

incentives and

disincentives proposed in 1979 was never passed. In general,
the

current

growth,

population policy

improve

the

quality

aims
of

to

control

population,

population
ensure

the

reproduction of healthy children and improve their upbringing.
A couple

is generally encouraged to have only one child;

however, some couples can have a second child several years
after their first birth (See Appendix for other exceptions).
The

detailed

regulations

are

worked

out

by

the

local

authorities in accordance with different situations. That is,
to implement the one child family policy,
benefits and disincentives

are

applied.

differ from one place to another,

various economic
These

regulations

especially from urban to

rural areas.
The

major

regulations

economic

iriclude wage

incentives

in

various

bonuses,

extra

work

provincial
points,

and

housing priorities. Mothers who pledge to have one child will
receive additional maternity leave. The only child is eligible
for

a

range

of

benefits

in

kindergarten,

school,

and

university enrollment, and priority in employment placement
after graduation.
These incentives have been rather effective for people in
the cities,
(Dalsimer

but have had

and

Nisonoff,

little appeal to rural
1987).

For

example,

families

space within

housing is not a problem for most rural families whereas it is
a major problem for most urban families. Wage bonuses apply

I
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l

mainly to urban parents who earn wages at factories, offices,
and enterprises,

and seldom to agricultural

rewards.

Some

wealthy rural enterprises offer bonuses, but they are lower
than urban bonuses. Under the new agricultural responsibility
system, both the work point incentives and extended maternity
leaves are unlikely to have much effect. With the exception of
free health care,

the various welfare benefits are rarely

available to most rural families.

Because these incentives

have not worked well in the countryside, some rural areas have
sought to offer additional grain allotments,

larger family

plots, or job preference in commune industries to one-child
families (Dalsimer and Nisonoff, 1987).
The punishments (disincentives) more often affect rural
families, but their efficiency is limited. Some disincentives
used in the rural areas include reductions
allotments for second and third children,
family goods

(such as television sets,

in state grain

expropriation of

bicycles,

or sewing

machines), fines on overquota births, or withdrawal of part of
the families' fertile plots under the family responsibility
system.
The one-child-family policy has affected almost everyone
in the

nation.

Then what

Chinese women as a whole?

special

effect does

it have

on

The following chapter presents the

major findings on changes in Chinese women's lives associated
with the policy.

CHAPTER IV

THE GENERAL INFLUENCE OF THE POLICY ON CHINESE WOMEN

In the past twelve years,

during which the one-child-

family policy has been in effect, several general changes have
occurred.

The birth rate of China has decreased, and women's

lives have been greatly changed in many aspects. This section
will mainly deal with the impact of the one child family on
Chinese women as a whole.
First of all, Chinese women's age at first marriage has
changed. In 1972, the average age at marriage for urban women
was 22.6, and 21.0 for rural women. By the end of 1979, the
first

year

of

the

implementation

of

the

one-child-family

policy and its associated late marriage programs raised the
mean age at first marriage, which increased to 24.6 and 22.8
for urban and rural women respectively

(See Table II).

The

results from a 1982 survey show that the average marriage age
for

urban

and

respectively.

rural

women

In Shanghai

had

reached

25.19

and

22.54

(the largest city in China)

the

average marriage age for women had jumped to 26.8 from 22.6 by
1981.
The increasing age for first marriage is mainly due to:
the tightly controlled marriage permits by local government.

I
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In the past, there was no serious control of age for marriage.
Usually, soon after a man and a woman got engaged, they had a
wedding

ceremony,

and

announced

their

formal

marriage

to

people around.

TABLE II
WOMEN'S AVERAGE AGE AT MARRIAGE, BY YEAR OF
MARRIAGE AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE
Year of Marriage

Urban

Rural

1972

22.6

21. 0

1979

24.6

22.8

Source: H. Yuan Tien, 'Age at Marriage
Republic of China', China Quarterly,
March 1983.

in

the

People's

After the one child family policy was announced in 1979,
the central government issued a strict regulation to restrict
young people from having an early marriage. The legal age for
women to get married now is

22.

Since

1979,

it has

been

extremely difficult to get a marriage permit before the age of
22. The purpose of this practice is to postpone the average
marriage age of young women, and in turn delay childbearing
age and finally reduce the nation's fertility rate.
Secondly, Chinese women,

generally,

no longer have the

alternative to give birth to more than one child. The "birth
quota" system in the one-child-family policy indicates that·
each married woman can have only one child. And birth quotas

l
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are usually decided upon nationally and distributed downward
to provinces, cities, towns, counties, and other basic local
levels.

Therefore,

expected to get a

before a

woman gets pregnant,

birth quota

certificate

she

from her

is

local

official in charge of birth control. Or she must report to the
local birth control office within the first three months of
her pregnancy. Failure to do so will result in a fine or/and
"mobilization" to get an abortion. In addition, without this
official authorization,

she is unable to get prenatal care

because she does not have the authorization paper to show to
the local health clinics or hospitals.

And the "unplanned"

new-born baby will have difficulties later in registering for
grain allotments, schooling and medical care.
Third, the percentage of women using contraceptives has
gone up very rapidly since 1979.
Even during the early 1970s, contraceptives were seldom
used

in

the

country.

In

some

poor

contraception had never been heard of.

and

remote

areas,

A decade later,

in

1982, only three years after the implementation of the one
child family policy, this had changed dramatically.

"China's

contraceptive prevalence rate was as high as that in developed
low-fertility countries. According to the one per thousand
sample fertility survey carried out in 1982,
married

women

of

reproductive

contracepting" (Chen, 1985).

age

(aged

69.46% of the
15-49)

were

By comparison, in Japan only 61%

of the married women age 15-49 were practicing contraception
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in 1976, and 69% of married women aged 15-44 in the U.S. were
contracepting in the same year (Yan,

1983; Davis-Friedmann,

1983) .
The

most

frequently

used

contraceptive

method

among

Chinese women is the !DD, which accounts for 50.2% of all
contraceptives in China

(1/1,000 survey in 1982).

In the

urban areas, 39% of women rely on IUDs, while the percentage
for rural women is 53% (Chen, 1985).
The second most popular contraceptive method used

in

China is sterilization, accounting for 35% of China's total
contraceptives in 1982.

Of this

3 5%,

2 5% are women users

(Chen, 1985).
Several varieties of oral contraceptives and condoms are
also utilized in China, but mainly among urban women (Chen,
1985).
The increase in the late marriage rate for females, the
prevalent usage of contraceptives among women, and the policy
of

"one woman,

one child"

have

brought a

sharp fertility

decline to the nation. For example, in 1973, three years after
the third birth control campaign, the total fertility rate was
still

4.539

(2.387

and

respectively).

In

1980,

implementation

of

the

5.008

for

however,

urban

only

one-child-family

and

rural

areas

one year after the
policy,

the

total

fertility rate dropped to 2.238 (1.147 for urban region and
2.480 for rural region) (Chen, 1985; Qian and Xian, 1983). The
crude birth rate dropped from 33.59 per thousand in 1970 to
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20.83 per thousand in 1989 (Beijing Review, Oct.15-21, 1990).
Meanwhile, the natural growth rate decreased from 25.83 per
thousand to 14.32 per thousand (Beijing Review, 1990). "These
indices are below the average of other developing countries,"
says Peng Pei-yun, "The rapid population growth is basically
under control."

6

Then what advantage and disadvantage do these practices
have

for

Chinese

women's

influence on women's

daily

lives?

status at home

Do

they

and social

have
images

any
in

society? Do urban and rural women get the same benefits form
the policy? Are there any contradictions between the policy
and Chinese women's interests? How can we predict the impact
on later generations of women?

The rest of the paper will be

devoted to a discussion of these and related issues.

6

Peng Pei-yun has been the Minister of the State Family
Planning Commission since 1988. She said these words in an
interview with the reporters from Women of China and China
Today (See Women of China, Vol XXXX No.8 Aug. 1991:28)

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLICY FOR URBAN WOMEN

According to Ralf Dahrendorf, a famous conflict theorist
in sociology, all institutional patterns display two mutually
contradictory sets of role expectations ---- one to obey, the
other to revolt ---- and therefore actors must decide which
set they will follow (Porter and Taplin, 1987) .\The one-child'---

family policy can be regarded as
pattern,

which generates

a

kind of

institutional

contradictio~~.___,\\i~

generates the

contradiction between State's interests and the interests of
_'.\

the

-

people-JCif we

consider urban

and

rural

women as

two

different groups of actors, their basic reaction to the onechild-family policy can be described as "One obeys, the other
revolts".

That is,

one is compatible with the policy,
)\

the

-".

other is contradictory to it.'

_____,

The implication of the policy and the reaction of both
urban and rural women toward the policy can be explained also
by the "theory of demographic change and response"

(Weeks,

1989:78). This theory emphasizes that people usually respond
to the demographic change, but their response will be in terms
of personal goals, not national goals. "People must perceive
a

personal

need

to

change

behavior

before

a

decline

in

24

fertility will take place, and the kind of response they make
will depend on what means are available to them."

(Weeks,

1989:83).

a

This

theoretical

perspective

suggests

very

important link between the every day lives of individuals and
the kinds of population changes that take place in society.
Based upon the fragments of theories discussed above, the
following two chapters will make a detailed analysis of the
implications of the one-child-family policy for

urban and

rural women, and their different reactions to it.
Since

1979,

considerable

change

has

taken

place

in

women's lives. Yet these changes have occurred unevenly due to
geographical and economic impediments. The implications of the
new family policy for both urban and rural women are even more
difficult to assess. Generally speaking, the policy has turned
out to have more advantages for urban women than for rural
women. Available evidence suggests that the status of urban
women has improved. Urban women seem to be much more willing
to

obey and

accept this

strongly oppose it.

policy rather

For instance,

than

to

revel t

or

the overall attitude of

urban women toward the gender of children has changed so that
a female child is as acceptable as a male child;

the time

urban women spend in child rearing has been greatly shortened;
urban women's educational levels have increased; the status of
urban women at home has been raised; the social welfare and
health care for young urban mothers have steadily improved;
and urban women are much more active

in participating in
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working out of home, and engaging in the feminist movement.
The following section will examine the impact of the onechild-family policy on urban women's reproductive behavior and
its relation to women's educational level.

FERTILITY RATE AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

One effect on urban women's life is the decline in the
number of years that they devote to caring for their children.
According to the one per thousand fertility survey in 1982,
the total number of children a married urban woman bore during
1952-55 was 6.574. The total number increased to 7.622 during
1955-58.

Since the

implementation of

the

one-child-family

policy in 1979, the total fertility rate has dropped sharply.
According to Li Bohua and Ronald Freedman,
1982,

the

average

number

of

children

an

between 1979 urban woman

has

dropped to 1.663.
In the past,
middle years,
beyond,

then,

a woman had to spend much of her

say from her early 20s into her mid 40s or

engaging

in

childbearing

accompanied by associated housework.

and

child

rearing,

According to Professor

Zhu Chuzhu's survey study in 1987, 7 Chinese women before the
1960s

were

mainly

concerned

with

family

life

and

human

7

Professor Zhu Chu-zhu in Xi' an Jiaotong University
conducted a special investigation on the life cycle of Chinese
women in 1987. Women involved in this survey are from both
urban and rural areas from 21 Provinces. She got back 1,612
questionnaires for this survey.

~- ~I
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reproduction.

They had little education and were scarcely

aware of the experience of adolescence.

"During their short

life span of 50 years, 20 years would be occupied by frequent
pregnancies and the raising of family (children)" (Zhu, 1991).
The one-child-family policy has legally liberated women from
the long period of child bearing and enabled them to develop
their own interests, to seek after their own career, and to
improve their own educational level.
stated,

Just as Professor Zhu

"Family planning has greatly reduced the number of

children

a

woman

now

receives

(a

woman

would

bear).

The

average number of births has now dropped from five or six, to
two

or three

in a

woman's

life time."

"They

(Women)

now

practice late marriage, late childbearing and less of it." She
says, "Less time is spent on giving birth nowadays and they
(women) receive an education for over ten years" (Zhu, 1991) . 8
Ten years of education for urban women might not be so
significant in some relatively developed countries. In China,
it

is

indeed an

important fact.

It

is

even more so when

8

Zhu Chu-zhu is a professor of demography and economics
at Jiaotong University in Xi'an,
China.
In 1988, Zhu
participated in the project of "Co-ordinating Chinese
Population Growth with Social and Economic Development," which
won first prize in the National Award for Progress in Science
and Technology. Zhu is an authority in the field of population
studies concerning Chinese women. She is the first Chinese
expert to undertake research on the life cycle of women. At
present, she is responsible for a research project about
"women's employment and child birth in China," sponsored by
the UNFPA (United Nations Family Planning Association). Zhu is
endeavoring to improve the social status of Chinese women. She
often gives lectures on population theory and control, and its
importance for the social and economic development of China.
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compared to the educational level of rural women in China {See
Table III).

TABLE III
LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF RURAL WOMEN IN 1980
Level of education

% of women

Senior Middle School

3.5

Junior Middle School

9

Primary School

45.0

Illiterate

42.0
100

Source: Jingji Yanju (Economic Research), June 20, 1982.

Based on the survey of 707 peasant women of childbearing
age in 1980, we can see that only 3.5% of rural women have ten
years education,

9. 5% of them have a seven to eight years

education. Of these women, 45% go to school for five or six
years, and 42% are simply illiterate. A report appearing in
Women of China, March,
years,

1990, revealed that in the past ten

the serious educational situation of rural

Chinese

women has not changed much.
Unlike rural women,

more and more women in the cities

have begun to engage in higher education. According to Worden,
of all the college students in China, 24% of them are urban
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women. Some of them are even at the top of the ivory tower. 9
A postdoctoral research system was first introduced to
China in 1985.

According to Wang Xiaoming's report,

since

then, 161 postdoctoral research centers have been established,
and 935 people have studied or are studying in these centers.
Among these people, 39 are urban women.
Thirty-nine is a small number, but it is a positive sign
for women's, especially of urban women's, desire to get more
education and be equal with men.
"Since

the

practice

of

family

planning

in

1979,

the

dropping of birth rate has completely changed the female life
cycle (in China)" (Zhu, 1991). Like the Marriage Law in 1950,
which abolished the feudal marriage system restricting women,
the one-child-family policy further upgrades women's status
and legally liberates them from endless childbearing and child
rearing.

IMPROVED SOCIAL IMAGES

As previously mentioned, the one-child-family policy has
helped reduce

the

fertility

rate

and

raise

urban women's

educational level steadily since it was first issued in 1979.
Women's education
9

is one of the most

basic

and

important

The temporary educational structure in China is often
referred to as an Ivory Tower. The higher you go up the tower,
the fewer people there are. Thus those engaged in postdoctoral
research may be regarded as people at the top of the ivory
tower.
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factors in liberating women and changing their social images.
Generally, education credentials seem to be more important for
females than males in professional careers. Male superiors,
let us suggest, are usually less confident in judging women's
ability to do a job than in judging their education. The more
education a woman has, the more likely she is to be employed
(Farr, 1990; Fox, 1989). When women are freed from the burden
of childbearing, they have more time and more opportunities to
engage in education and special training.

And the greater

their educational level, the greater is their participation in
production and

in various kinds

of

social

labor.

This

is

important in a country with an age-old feudal tradition of
male

supremacy

and

contempt

for

women.

The

new

breed

of

educated, capable women cannot be dismissed as having "long
hair and little knowledge"

(one of many such old sayings in

the language). Many show remarkable ability. Quite a few of
them have been selected as model workers and serve in local
people's

congress

and

other

responsible

bodies

(Women

of

China, Vol. XXXIX, No.3, Mar.1990:18). One particular example
is

the

rising

number

of

women

deputies

in

the

National

People's Congress and its Standing Committee. In 1954, at the
First National People's Congress,

women deputies comprised

only 11. 9% of the Congress membership and only 5% of the
Committee membership.

But at the Seventh National people's

Congress in 1988, the number rose to 21.34% and 11.6% (Huang,
1990).
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In fact,

the number of employed urban women has been

increasing constantly since 1979 and now accounts for more
than 37% of the working force in China. What are the major
factors that make urban women work outside the home? Kang Jun
and his colleagues did a

"systematical and multi-aspected

survey" in 1989. A sample of one thousand-eight hundred female
workers

and

staff

from

a

total

of

90

enterprises

and

institutions in seven cities were involved in this survey.
These researchers classified the major employment motives into
the following six categories listed in Table IV.

TABLE IV
MAJOR EMPLOYMENT MOTIVES OF URBAN WOMEN
Order

Motive

Percentage

First

Generating Income

72.9%

Second

Striving equal social status with men

66.3%

Third

Making contributions to the society

64.7%

Fourth

Receiving recognition from society

37.1%

Fifth

Sharing in community life

29.8%

Sixth

Seeking employment because others do

22.8%

Source: Women of China, June 1989, P43.

According to Kang Jun, the major motive for urban women
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to join the working force is financial (72%). The second most
important motive is to strive for equal social status with men
(66.3%). These two highest ranked motives suggest that many
urban women have realized the strong relationship between
economic independence and women's related social status. That
is, economic independence can help women obtain equal social
status with men. Above all, the results suggest a very obvious
change in urban women's self-esteem and self-confidence.
In

a

traditionally

male-dominated

country

like

China,

(prior to the communist revolution

women

in 1949)

thought about themselves as consumers and their husbands as
bread-winners and providers. They seldom went out to work
and their bound feet confined them completely to the stoves
and homes. The change in attitude toward working outside and
money-making reflects a noticeable transition of ideology. It
indicates that urban women have started to consider their
working out of the home as essential to the family income. The
part they play in the family life is no longer dependent or
subordinate. A 1990 survey of more than 2,000 women residents
in

ten

cities,

including

Beijing,

Harbin

and

Shanghai,

indicates that over 80% of urban women favor the employment of
women. Some 90% of the women surveyed felt that doing well in
their work was an important goal.

And about 70% said that

career and family were equally important to them

(Beijing

Review, Nov.12-18, 1990).
Shortly after the founding of the People's Republic in

,.....-
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1949,

there were only 2. 6 million women workers and staff

members in the nation's cities, about 7.5% of the total work
force

(Beijing Review,

Nov.

12-18,

1990) .

"By 1989,

urban

women workers had numbered 51.37 million, accounting for 37.4%
of the nation's total. The 1989 ratio, which was nearly five
times that of 1949,

is among the world's highest for women

workers. In 1986, the employment rate for women in cities and
towns was 82% nationwide.

In 1989, the employment rate for

women was as high as 95%

in the Shenzhen Special Economic

Zone. 10

Between 1987 and 1988, the employment rate for women

was higher than for men during the same period (Huang, 1990).
Beijing Review confirmed again in March, 1991 that China
has more than 51 million female workers,
total work force.

about 37% of the

In the light industry and service trades,

women account for 47.1%, and in joint ventures and foreignfinanced enterprises and institutions, they account for more
than 50% of the staff.
Of the nation's scientists and technicians, one-third are
women and more than 10% of them hold professional titles such
as professor, associate professor and senior engineer. There
are

17,087
10

professors

engaged

in

teaching

in

China's

In order to promote economic exchange and cooperation
with foreign countries, a decade ago China began to establish
Special Economic Zones (ENZs). Now there are five of them:
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in
Fujian Province and the island province of Hainan. All are
along the country's south and southeast coast. In these zones,
special and more flexible preferential policies on outside
investment are put into effect in order to attract capital
from abroad .

.....

,.......-
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institutions

of

higher

establishments and 1,570,

education

and

in

research

or 9.2% of all professors,

are

women. Some 811 women, or 52% of all female professors, work
in the medical field.

In 1989,

of the country's 445 state

invention prize winners, 68 or 15% were women (Beijing Review,
Mar. 11-17, 1991).
Although China's "equal pay for equal work" policy and
economic reform have encouraged women to work outside the
home,

and

although

the

improvement

educational level has strengthened

of

urban

women's

women's desire to work,

the one-child-family policy seems to play a special role in
urban women's participation in compensated labor. Without the
reduced burden of childbearing and child rearing, women would
not have enough time and energy to pursue

formal education

and special training. Without education and the related change
of self-consciousness, urban women would not have the strong
desire to become the equal financial partners of men.

Nor

would they think about further improvement of their social
status.

Even

though

the

changing

world

and

economic reform might finally achieve these,
take a longer time.

the

current

it will surely

Therefore the one-child-family policy,

together with its associated programs for women,

has done the

fundamental work of setting urban women free from home, and
sending them out to become competitive money-makers in the
society.

34

THE POLICY AND THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT

Besides helping raise urban women's positions at home and
in society, the one-child-family policy also helped start the
feminist movement among urban female

intellectuals

in the

1980s.
Before the 1980s,

most women

in China were not very

sensitive to the discrimination against them in the workforce
and mistreatment in the family.

They simply regarded their

position at home or in the workplace as an institutionalized
legitimacy,

and

seldom related

their

mistreatment

to

the

issues of discrimination or the social inequality of women
(Croll, 1985). They firmly believed that the establishment of
socialism would automatically result

in the

liberation of

women.
Dramatic changes took place, however, in the 1980s. Newly
founded women's magazines began to discuss women's problems
explicitly. The pages of China Women's News,

for instance,

were filled with exposes and denunciations of discrimination
faced by women. "Feminist outcries" began to appear with some
regularity

in

print

(Henig

and

Hershatter,

1988).

This

recognition of gender inequality at work and in the family
also found expression in the emergence of separate women's
organizations: schools, professional societies, and women's
studies groups for example. The Chinese feminist movement was

...
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well

under

way,

among

primarily

the

urban

female

intellectuals.
Then

why

is

it

that

the

feminist

consciousness

movement in China occurred in the 1980s,

and

instead of 1970s,

60s, or 50s? How and why did it take place at all?
Many

analysts

suggest

that

the

precondition

of

this

movement is the increasingly explicit and open decade after
the end of the Cultural Revolution, particularly the economic
reforms.

Some argue that

in the previous years,

all work

assignments had been centralized, and individual work units
did not have any right to hire or fire workers. After 1978,
however, much of this system changed. Work units were given
the right to select new employees, and to hire and fire. The
establishment
industrial

of

private

companies

enterprises

were

made

was

encouraged,

responsible

for

their

and
own

prof its and losses. On the one hand, these policies created
job opportunities for urban residents, including women. On the
other hand, work units used their newly obtained powers to
discriminate against women.

On the whole, this argument holds

that economic reforms had put women into a very difficult
situation in the labor market, and that in turn generated the
feminist movement.
Other people argue that the feminist movement appeared in
the

1980s

information

because
about

of

the

Western

increasing

countries

and

availability
Western

of

feminist

ideas. By then, newspapers and magazines frequently contained

.\
I
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reports about the lives and problems of women in the United
States and Europe, and about feminism and the women's movement
in the West. A number of Chinese women who had the opportunity
to study in the West applied what they learned of Western
feminist ideas to an understanding of their own predicament
(Henig and Hershatter, 1988).
Still others suggest that the movement should give thanks
to

the

political

liberalization

of

the

post

cultural

revolution decade in China. They believe that it is political
liberalization that made it possible for women to publicly
discuss

their

dissatisfactions,

and

helped

generate

appearance of many women's newspapers and magazines.

the

(China

has a state controlled press, and it was only after 1978 that
people

ventured

to

produce

semi-official

or

non-official

publications.)
In my view, all the above preconditions were necessary
for the emergence of China's feminist movement in the 1980s,
but

the

most

fundamental

precondition

was

the

one-child

policy.
Since the implementation of the one-child-family policy
in 1979, most women intellectuals have placed much faith in
it.

They favored

the one-child-family policy

in that

it

legally reduced the number of years women must devote to
childbearing and child rearing and enabled them to devote time
to their own education, career and hobbies. At the same time,
however, they disliked the revival of some feudal remnants of
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the oppression of women caused by the population policy. For
example, they were very concerned about the reappearance of
female infanticide, the increased pressure on girls to leave
school

early

and

the

uncontrollable

wife-battering,

etc.

These and many other direct consequences of the one-childfamily policy forced intellectual urban women to reconsider
their own value in society and at home from women's point of
view.

Also

they

were

inspired

to

question

the

social

structures in China and the series of policies imposed by the
government.
Why are women discriminated against in the labor market?
Why

should

female

intellectuals

(academicians

and

other

professionals) retire at age 55 while male intellectuals may
continue to work to age 65?

Why did Tianjin

(one of the

biggest cities in China) in 1985 enroll only 3% women workers
and

97%

male

workers?

Since

there

has

long

been

a

constitution to "protect" women, why should there be so much
inequality?

Some intellectual urban women felt that it was

time for them to do something to express their thoughts, to
protest women's inferior social position, and to awaken the
consciousness of other women. The open-door policy and the
information
movement

about

the

development

of

an

active

women's

in the West helped them realize the options and

alternatives.
The discussion

in the People's Republic of

China of

women's issues in the 1980s has been profoundly different from
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earlier discussions in the following ways:
1. The most recent discussion was started and directed by
urban women intellectuals and has remained so.
2.

The movement has

a

very clear goal;

that

is,

to

improve Chinese women's awareness of themselves and their
personal

development,

to

put

an

end

to

women's

self-

censorship, and to call on society as a whole to alter the
context of women's lives. Women are not baby-making machines.
They are human beings. As human beings, they must fight for
their rights, their interests and their fulfillment (Henig and
Hershatter, 1988).
3. Feminist works of fiction appeared for the first time
in China's history in the early 1980s. For instance,
Jie,

one of China's famous women writers,

Zhang

produced a short

story in 1982 entitled "The Ark". It is about three divorced
women, and was regarded by Western writers as China's first
feminist work of fiction (Henig and Hershatter, 1988). One of
the first public statements denouncing discrimination toward
women was a poem by Wang Fuhua entitled "Four Questions",
published in March 1983 in People's Daily.

11

Each stanza in

the poem began with a phrase like "Times have changed; men and
women are equal". It is Chairman Mao's phrase, and it has been
used

by

the

Communist

Party

to

proclaim

its

success

in

liberating women after 1949. Therefore, the poet asked "why
are

men
11

and

women

not

equal?"

A national newspaper in China.

The

poem

criticized
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discrimination toward women in almost every sector of society:
in

pay

for

agricultural

work,

factory

hiring,

college

admission, and treatment in the family. Actually Wang was one
of the first to publicly describe these phenomena as gender
inequality (Henig and Hershatter, 1988). This and many other
feminist outcries were significant because they expressed the
awareness that the status of women was a social problem that
remained unresolved.
In short,
occurred

under

the feminist movement in the 1980s in China
rather

complicated

social

and

historical

conditions. The one-child-family policy, no doubt, contributed
to the emergence of the consciousness of women's issues. The
following section will examine urban women's consciousness of
the importance of birth control.

CHANGED ATTITUDES

In the past few years, with the help of the All-China
Women's Federation, a network of family-planning workers has
been set up in every city. These family planning workers hand
out

information on birth control,

help women

realize

the

importance of slowing population growth, and inform them of
the material rewards for doing so and proper penalties for not
doing

so

(China

Today,

Mar.1990:26).

It

seems

that

this

program works especially well in big cities. Nowadays, most of
the urban women have realized that the rising population is a

40
burden, not a blessing, to the country as a whole, to local
areas

and

to

individual

families.

Over-population

is

a

tremendous stumbling block to social and economic development
and to the improvement in people's living standards.
What's more fascinating is that many educated urban woman
have been organized by the All-China Women's Federation and
have left the cities and towns in order to serve the needs of
women in poor and remote villages throughout China.

Their

basic goal is to publicize the government's family planning
policy and to ensure that women have rights and opportunities
equal to those of men.
The change in marriage and population ideology gives rise
to the change in fertility behavior.

The old,

traditional

views on early marriage, early childbearing and several births
have been largely replaced by the practices of later marriage
and smaller families.
The following tables provide a comparison of urban and
rural women on marriage, and fertility behaviors.
First, an urban-rural comparison of the first marriage
is presented in Table V.
As indicated, in 1987,

2,510,339 urban women got married

for the first time. Among those, 1,669,495 women were 23 years
old or older (Over 23 is here considered late marriage).

The

late marriage rate was 66.50%. Compared with the late marriage
rate in the countryside, the urban rate was 19.42% higher.
While the number of urban women's late marriages increased by
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92,126 from 1986,

the number for rural women decreased by

266,038.

TABLE V
FIRST MARRIAGE OF CHINESE WOMEN IN 1987
Regions

Total No.
Marriage

23 Yrs or
Older Women

Compare
with
1986

Late Marriage
Rate

Cities

2,510,339

1,669,495

+92,126

66.50%

Country

5,044,246

2,374,640

-266,038

47.08%

Source: Pamphlet of China's Population Document by China's
Population Research Center in Beijing, Dec. 1988; derived
from Tables 7 & 9, PP291, 293.
As

for the birth control rate

(See Table VI) ,

urban

women's rate is 2.88% higher than rural women's.

TABLE VI
URBAN & RURAL WOMEN'S BIRTH CONTROL RATE
BY METHOD IN 1987
Region

Hysterectomy
Users

Cities

10,224,196

17,219,673

623,590

88.67%

Country

33,889,580

33,332,992

394,707

85.97%

IUD
Users

Other
Method
Users

Total Birth
Control
Rate

Source: Pamphlet of China's Population Document by China's
Population Research Center in Beijing, Dec. 1988; derived from
Tables 15 & 17; P299 & P301.

Table VII shows that in 1987 the unplanned birth rate for
urban women was 9.25%, while the rate was 20.61% for rural
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women. Another indicator that suggests a different attitude
between

rural

and

urban

women

is

a

comparison

of

the

percentage of those who obtain one-child-certificates

(See

Table VIII).

TABLE VII
UNPLANNED BIRTHS IN 1987
Regions

Total No.
of Birth

No. Unplanned
Birth

Unplanned
Birth Rate

All cities

3,451,833

319,212

9.25%

Countryside

9,905,697

2,041,540

20.61%

Source: Pamphlet of China's Population Document by
China's Population Research Center in Beijing, Dec. 1988;
derived from Tables 27 & 29.

By the end of 1987, 32.3 million women overall got a onechild-certificate,

an

increase

of

1. 8

million

over

198 6.

(Chinese Population Yearbook 1988:280) If we study the data by
urban-rural region,

however,

we find that the situation is

uneven. Table VIII indicates that more than 2,210,765 urban
women in 1987 than in 1986 claimed the one child certificates;
the rate increased 1.26%. On the other hand,

the number of

rural

1987

women

claiming

the

certificates

1, 13 7, 816 from the year before,

in

dropped

and the claiming rate was

25.28% lower than that of urban women.
It appears that it is much easier to carry out the onechild-family policy in the cities than in the countryside.
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Evidence also show that urban women react to the policy with
a

more

active

and

positive

attitude

than

their

rural

counterparts. But why are urban women more willing to accept
the one-child-family policy than rural women? What are the
existing preconditions for the achievements of the one-childfamily policy among urban women?

TABLE VIII
NUMBER AND RATE OF WOMEN GETTING ONE-CHILDCERTIFICATES IN 1987
Regions

Total No.
Certificates

Compare with
1986

Rate

Compare
with 1986

~
0

All Cities

15,116,922

+2,210,765

35.96%

+ 1. 26%

Country

10,755,338

-1,137,816

10.68%

- 0.44%

Source:
Pamphlet of China's Population Document by China's
Population Research Center in Beijing, Dec. 1988; derived from
Tables 11 & 13, PP295 & 297.

INCENTIVES FOR YOUNG MOTHERS

Major factors that inspire urban women to have only one
child are the various incentives offered by the government and
the improved health care for young mothers and their babies.
The following are the most popular rewards and chief health
care programs that are available for urban women (Kane, 1985).
The

first

program

worth

mentioning

here

is

the

development of a modern health-care network. Like a protective
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umbrella, this network aims at protecting both mother and her
child from the very beginning of a woman's pregnancy.
Usually, when a "planned" pregnancy is confirmed,
woman

may

join

the

"authorization"

health

paper

to

care

the

program

relevant

by

showing

doctor.

Then

the
the
she

receives a card outlining the antenatal checkups required and
a notebook to be used in recording her physical condition, the
development of the unborn baby and the postnatal health of
both mother and baby.

She will be advised to read certain

books about pregnancy, nursing and raising an infant.
During her pregnancy, the woman receives free antenatal
examinations in the third,

fifth,

sixth and eighth months.

More frequent examinations will be conducted if there is any
problem.

Medical workers

activities,

work

and

will

rest,

physical work one can do.

give

and

advice

what

on

kind

appropriate

and

amount

of

Guidance is also provided as to

personal hygiene, diet and dress during pregnancy, and the way
to avoid disease and minimize the risk of harm from radiation
and certain medicines. The aim of this program is a troublefree pregnancy and delivery of a healthy baby.
The introduction of the provision of a paid maternity
leave only for the first child also plays an important part in
encouraging urban women to become parents, but only once.

The

mothers of first borns can have three months paid maternity
leave as soon as they give birth. Women no longer have to
choose

between

working

and

having

a

child.

In

order

to
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overcome the concern of some women about entrusting their
precious only child to outside care after the first three
months, an alternative offer has been developed in some areas,
that is, the extended maternity leave. A factory in Shanghai,
for instance,

"offers one year's maternity leave to single

child mothers, granting full pay and an assurance that neither
their

promotion

prospects

nor

wage

increases

will

be

jeopardized as a result" (Kane, 1985). Some textile mills in
Henan Province offer a three-year-maternity leave to singlechild mothers,

with 60% of pay per month

(Women of China,

1991).
Through such policies, urban women are given the choice
of looking after their only child themselves.
The

increasingly

cooperative

child care

improved

day-care

arrangements

make

it

centers

and

possible

for

working mothers to go back to work after their maternity
leave. This, in turn, encourages their working units to give
them further training and career development. With a job to go
back to,

the fact that childbearing is the only future for

married women is no longer true.
Additionally,
associated

servic~

there

is

a

facilities

rapid
in

development

the

cities,

of

the

such

as

laundries, sewing and clothes-mending shops and repair shops
for household equipment. These and many other public services
help lighten the burdens of urban women. Even though most of
them have to work eight hours a day, six days a week, their
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lives

have

been

made

much

easier

than

their

mothers'

generation.
Another factor that helps form the small family norm is
the pension system in cities.

If you work in a state-owned

company, you can get a pension after you retire. Women are not
excluded.

Exactly

like

men,

a

woman

can

get

80%

of

her

previous salary after she is retired if she has worked in
state industry for over 30 years. Otherwise, she gets 60%, 40%
or less, depending on how long she has worked in a certain
working unit. In some cities, childless women can get pensions
of 100% of their previous salary (Xinhua, 10 July 1979, and 7
Nov. 1979, in Chinese).
Given this situation,

children born to urban families

have lost some of their value to their parents as a long-term
investment for security in old age.
child

in

the

cities

is

much

more

Beside,
expensive

bringing up a
than

in

the

countryside. According to 1986 statistics, it costs 6,600 yuan
(about

$1320)

to raise a

child to

the

age

of

16

in the

countryside, while in urban areas it costs 18,740 yuan (about
$6148)

(Deng, 1989) . I remember hearing a lot of complaints

from my friends and colleagues about the money they spend on
their children. Usually an urban child uses about one third or
even half of the family salary because he/she needs care,
food,

clothing,

and

education.

Unlike

children

in

the

countryside, children in the cities cannot be much help to
their families when they are young.
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Since the average monthly salary of an urban woman is
about $40 only (Hou, 1991), it is almost impossible to have
any surplus left after all the expenses are paid. If you plan
to have a child, your standard of living will most likely be
lowered. Therefore, it requires serious consideration for an
urban couple to decide to have even one child.
Priority of housing is another vital attraction to urban
women.
Due to the longer life span (The average life span rose
from 35 years in 1949, to 50 years in the 60s, to 69 years in
1987) , 12

and a great increase in the urban population in the

past ten years, housing has become a big problem in China's
cities. According to the household survey in 1987, the average
space for an urban resident is only 3.8 square meters, while
a

rural

resident may have

as many as

16

square meters. 13

Therefore it is not uncommon in cities to see two or even
three generations living under one roof. This situation can
lead to some family conflicts and inconveniences.
Population control planners are aware of this problem. In
order to encourage urban women to accept the one-child-family
policy, they promise these women housing priority. That is, if
a woman stops at her first birth and claims the one-child
certificate, her working unit is responsible to arrange for an
12

See Hou Ruili's article, "China's Population Issues",
an interview with Peng Pei-yun, the Minister of the State
Family Planning Commission, China Today, Aug., 91, PP28-30.
13

See Chinese Population Yearbook, 1988.

.·
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apartment for her family. This is an important bonus to urban
residents, especially to those women who are trying to escape
their mothers-in-law!
Other incentives like priority for the only child to get
medical care, to go to better schools, to be given an extra 510 yuan per month until he/she is 14, are all attractive to
urban

women.

allocation

The

single

(e.g. Xinhua,

child
7 Nov.

also

has

priority

in

job

1979 in Chinese). This has

greatly reduced the fears of parents that their only daughter
will

not

get

the

beneficial

state

job

because

of

discrimination against women in some working units.
The above are the major factors that motivate urban women
to accept the one-child-family policy.
But what are the special factors that affect rural women
in their attitudes toward the

one-child~family

policy?

What

kind of unique situations are they in? Are they happy about
the policy? The following chapter will explore the possible
answers.

CHAPTER VI

IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLICY FOR RURAL WOMEN

Although the one-child-family policy has some potential
beneficial outcomes for women, and has worked out quite well
in cities, the consequences of this policy for rural women are
not so good. Women in rural areas remain more traditionally
bound

by

cultural

and

familial

expectations.

Generally

speaking, the policy negatively affects rural women's labor,
social, health and family status. These negative impacts can
be seen by examining the sensitive position of women at home,
the forced abortions perpetrated by government officials, the
increases in female infanticide and wife-abandonment, and an
increased

pressure

on

girls

to

leave

school

early.

This

chapter will examine each of these effects.

UNIVERSAL PREFERENCE FOR SONS

Usually,

a

rural

woman's

position

in

a

determined by the sex of the child she delivers.

family

is

When a boy

is born, the family will have some kind of celebration, say
distributing red eggs,

inviting relatives to enjoy "happy

noodles", or having a banquet in a restaurant. And in most
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cases, the mother's position in the family is automatically
raised, because she has made a "great contribution" to carry
on the family line. In contrast, if a woman gives birth to a
girl, there is generally no celebration, no party, no friends.
Instead the lying-in woman may have a bad time --- she might
be scolded by her mother-in-law, beaten by her husband, and
sometimes even divorced by her husband. The situation becomes
even

more

serious

in

the

countryside

now

that

China

is

carrying out the one-child-family policy.
Why are boys more desired than girls? In order to answer
this question, it is necessary to go back to the traditional
attitude of "the more children, the better", and the strong
emphasis on having a son to carry on the family name. In old
China, the child mortality rates were very high (The infant
mortality rate dropped from 20% in 1949 to 4% in the 1980sw)
and aged parents were mostly dependent on their sons
support.

for

Actually, there has been a universal preference for

sons in China for centuries. Sons continued the family line;
upon marriage they brought their wives to live in the parental
household and supported the older generation, and finally they
tended the ancestral shrines. As a typical example of this
expectation, the birth of a boy in preliberation China was
usually celebrated as the arrival of a scholar who would lead
the family to prosperity. But when a girl was born, she was
considered no more important than a future operator of the
14

See footnote 12 .
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family spinning-wheel. Although improved medical care today
has brought about a notable decrease of the infant death rate,
some old ideas are hard to change. In the countryside, care of
the elderly is still a family responsibility by custom. And to
many peasants,

the son is still the most reliable person,

especially when parents are getting old.

They consider a

daughter only as a kind of parasitic being. When she is young,
she

depends

on

her

parents;

when

she

grows

up

and

gets

married, she depends on her husband. Traditionally she cannot
carry on the family line, nor can she take care of her aged
parents, because as soon as she gets married, she will join
her husband's family, and become permanently separated from
her own. Therefore, the parents often feel quite disappointed
because the investment they put out to bring her up will never
come back to them.
In addition to the

influence of

the

old traditional

ideas, some practical problems have worsened the situation. In
cities,

most

factory

and

official

workers

have

regular

pensions when they are retired, but not the peasants in the
countryside. So when rural workers are too old to work in the
fields, they have to ask their children to take care of them,
and according to tradition,

they will ask sons instead of

daughters. Besides, the New Agricultural Policy has assigned
cultivated land to each family,

and in order to plough the

farmland, peasants need more hands, especially a strong labor
force.

In this way, some contradictions emerge directly from
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the

problems

responsibility
production,

of

the

system

new

state

encourages

policies.
peasants'

The

family

agricultural

but the one-child-family policy prohibits the

traditional rural strategy from increasing family labor power
and

income,

traditionally

accomplished

by

having

many

children, including several sons.
As a result of the current production system and the
traditional beliefs, many farmers in China still prefer large
families with several sons. So in order to have more children
and more sons, people have tried various methods to circumvent
the one-child-family policy.

In their desire to have sons,

some couples even kill their baby girls through neglect or
murder, a form of violence which has begun to draw more and
more attention from the government.

FEMALE INFANTICIDE

Actually,
centuries,

it

female infanticide is not new in China.
was

always

daughters

who

were

For

sacrificed

whenever there was competition for scarce resources.

Usually

female infanticide was practiced throughout China directly by
intervention at birth. And indirectly it was practiced as a
result of the malnutrition and
suffered

disproportionately

sickness
because

from which girls
of

the

unequal

distribution of family food and medical attention. One local
study of a village revealed that in the first five years of
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life the boys outnumbered the girls in proportion of 100 to 35
(Croll, 1985).

Of course, this was an exceptional situation.

However, without accurate data on the sex ratio at birth in
the past,

it has been impossible to measure the scale of

female infanticide. Data from Beijing in 1917 show that the
female mortality rate in the first year of life was nearly 30%
higher than that of males. The death rate of females from 1 to
5 years of age was 152 per 1000 and for males 122 per 1000. To
some extent, this indicates that the neglect is strong (Croll,
1985). Female infanticide used to be so widespread in China,
especially in remote and destitute places, that its serious
consequences are still felt today.

For example,

in Huaiyuan

County, Anhui Province, quite a few male villagers over 40
years old are unable to find female partners and get married
(Beijing Review, No.5 Jan.31, 1983 P4).
The Chinese people abolished the rural

feudal

system

during the Land Reform Movement shortly after the birth of the
People's Republic of China in 1949. As a result, the people's
livelihood improved remarkably. Women increasingly joined men
in productive labor and won greater respect from society.
many

years

female

infanticide

was

not

heard

of

For

(Beijing

Review, No5, Jan.31,1983:4).
The feudal idea of favoring boys over girls, however, is
not completely gone. Some couples feel unfulfilled if they do
not have a son. And a woman's failure to produce a male child
to carry on the family line is still condemned, and sometimes

1
I
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regarded as the greatest impiety.

Thus some couples go on

having children until a son is produced. This explains why a
great number of rural families have more than two children,
especially if the first two are daughters.
The problem was complicated by the nation's population
policy in 1979, which turns out to be a challenge for those
who desire sons to carry forward their family lines.
Since the one-child-family-policy allows each couple to
have only one child, some people sell, desert or even kill
their

female

having a

babies

son.

in order to preserve their

The exact figures of female

option of

infanticide are

unknown, but there are indications that it may not be a rare
occurrence.

For instance,

in some rural areas the ratio of

boys to girls is 5 to 1, People's Daily reported in April 1983
{The Oregonian, Sept.

26 ,91).

In the eastern district of

Hefei city in Anhui it was reported that at least 50 baby
girls were drowned within a period of two months after the new
population policy was implemented.

This must have contributed

to the unbalanced sex ratio of 112.45 to 100 among newborn
babies in Anhui in 1981 (Beijing Review, 2 May 1983, P13). Li
Chengrui,

Director

of

the

State

Statistics

Bureau

also

admitted that cases of drowning and abandoning female babies
have been found in some areas

(Ibid) .

Former Premier Zhao

Ziyang's condemnation of infanticide at the Fifth Session of
the Fifth National People's Congress would also suggest that
the practice is of national concern (The China Quarterly,
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1984).

Additionally, data released from China's 1990 census

show a suspiciously high ratio of boys over girls in reported
birth:

111.3 boys for every 100 girls.

By some statistics,

more than 600,000 baby girls (Oregonian, 91) who ought to be
there, are not. They have simply disappeared. They were not
reported in the 1990 census.
Where are the baby girls?
We know that the normal sex ratio throughout the world is
about 105 or 106 boys to 100 girls. Evidence has shown that
China, too, has a normal sex ratio (See Figure 2.)

Boys born per100 girls
110 -------- ---

/105 - -'·~·-

\. •
~
130

:

'....,,,..._,_/ 100
Boys born per 100 girls, by birth order

125

120

100
Sources: Chinese Census; Chinese State Statistical Bureau. Family Planning Commission

Figure 2. Uneven Birthrates in China.
Sunday Oregonian, June 23, 1991, A14.

Source: The

,,
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From the only four census counts ever done in China, we
can see that the sex ratio for newborn infants in the 1953
census was 104.9 to 100, and in the 1964 census it was 103.8
to 100.

It was only beginning with the 1982 census,

three

years after the one-child-family policy was implemented, that
the ratio changed noticeably. Two surveys done in 1987 and
1989 respectively show an increasingly high sex ratio.
1987 survey found 110. 5 boys to 100 girls,

The

while the 1989

survey found 112.5 boys to 100 girls (Oregonian June 23, 91).
Therefore, the sex ratio disparity shown in the 1990 census
was not a fluke.
As previously mentioned, female infanticide was common in
pre-1949 China. But after 1949 it seemed to disappear, until
recently.

In the past, peasants who sought to survive in a

competitive system of
crime

and

had

to

private

bear

most

landownership committed the
of

the

moral

responsibility

themselves. But now peasants may place part of the blame on
the government for limiting their freedom of choice to such an
extent that they are being forced to kill their own flesh and
blood (Wong Siu-lun, 1984). "We cultivate our own land, eat
our own grain and bring up all our children on our own. We
have taken responsibility of the land and there is no need for
you to bother about our child birth", some peasants said. And
more

and more

1984) .

complaints

like this

keep

appearing

(Wong,

,
'
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WIFE-BEATING AND WIFE-ABANDONMENT

A related topic regarding the birth of the so-called
"wrong" sex is wife-battering and wife-abandonment.
There is scientific evidence that the sex of a fetus is
not determined by the mother.

Yet in their great desire to

have sons, some men torment and desert their wives after they
give birth to daughters.
Since the announcement of the one-child-family policy in
1979, the incidence of families' punishing women for ''wrong"
reproductive

results

has

increased

substantially

in

the

countryside, although it is impossible to know how frequently
it

occurs.

The

Chinese

press

has

been

publicizing

and

protesting cases of familial abuse. And a common explanation
offered for wife-battering recently is the failure of a woman
to bear male offspring.
Shenyang,

In 1982, the Women's Federation of

Liaoning Province,

reported that

local cases of

maltreatment of women who gave birth to girls were on the
rise: twenty cases had been reported in the first half of the
year, in contrast to almost none a year before.

And there are

even more divorce cases associated with production of the
wrong (female) sex .(Henig and Hershatter, 1988) .

When a woman

does not produce sons after having had several daughters, or
if she does not want to disobey the birth-control policy, she
is frequently shunned or dismissed by her husband's family.

,
I
i
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Some husbands simply divorce their wives in order to marry
other women and produce sons.

Some commentators recognized

this phenomenon as an unintended result of the one -childfamily policy (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 1982).
The negative impact on the life of the abandoned women is
obvious and great. First of all, they are ridiculed or looked
down upon by the people around them, because they have been
"deserted" by their husbands.
Second, they run into serious economic problems. Because
they depended on their husbands and do not have any remarkable
skills, they have to toil in the fields like men, especially
in the situation of the new agricultural policy. And abandoned
women

often have

one

or two daughters.

In

order

to

help

support the family, the little girls are often forced to leave
school and do housework or work in the fields with their
mothers at an early age. According to statistics, "83% of the
7.2 million children who drop out of school are girls", girls
in the countryside (Women of China,

1990, Mar.

P2).

In the

long run, this situation is likely to produce a high number of
illiterate rural women. And low levels of education will most
likely have a direct effect on fertility rates.
some

remote

areas,

there

is

already

a

In fact,

vicious

cycle

in
of

ignorance followed by too many children, followed by poverty,
followed by greater ignorance

which again leads to too

many children and more poverty.
Third, these abandoned women lack self-confidence, and
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often do not have the courage to interact with people freely.
They cannot see any hope for their future, nor can they play
an active role in overcoming poverty in their families. They
are lonely,

isolated and disassociated.

Some of them truly

become social outcasts. A special report on this subject can
be found in Lu Yin's article in China Today, 1990.
The promising sign is that the government has

realized

the seriousness of wife-battering and wife-abandonment, and
since 1983, the All China Women's Federation has taken up the
issue

of

protecting

the

legal

rights

of

women

in

those

domains.
From the time the Communist Party took power in 1949, the
ACWF

has

been

the

official

and

exclusive

organization

representing women. As long as the Women's Federation exists,
government policy-makers apparently assume, women's interests
are supposed to be protected and there is no need to form
other organizations within, or independent of, the government.
Like many other mass organizations, the Women's Federation was
inactive during the Cultural Revolution, and reorganized only
in 1979. During the early 1980's the primary function of the
Women's Federation was to mobilize women to participate in
government-sponsored

political

campaigns,

rather

represent the interests of women to the government.

than

to

It was

only in 1983, four years after the implementation of the onechild-family policy,

that the ACWF began to take action to

protect women. By then, the issue of wife-battering and wife-
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abandonment

had

become

an

issue

that

could

no

longer

be

neglected.
In April, 1983, the Secretariat of the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party decided to make "protecting the
legal

rights

Women's

of women and children"

Federation's

work.

Local

a

major component of

branches

of

the

Women's

Federation responded with a number of innovative institutional
measures.

In one Shanxi county, the Women's Federation and

other local organizations in 1985 set up a
network for women's problems"

"letter and visit

with branches in every village,

to take complaints from women about parental interference in
marriage choice and maltreatment. Village women no longer had
to leave their home communities to voice their grievances. The
purpose

of

the

network

was

to

resolve

problems

through

mediation before legal action became necessary.
The heart of the Women's Federation work,

however,

is

intervention by dedicated local women cadres who want to see
justice

done.

In

one

rural

Liaoning

case,

for

instance,

Women's Federation cadres learned of a woman who had been
maltreated by her husband for six years. When she demanded a
divorce in June,

1984,

he cut out her tongue.

The Women's

Federation conducted an investigation, provided information to
the Party and government organs, and saw that the case was
publicized in the press. Their efforts resulted in the man's
trial and execution for causing grievous injury to his wife
(Renmin Ribao, Jan. 7, 1984:7).
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In

another

Federation of

case

Nantong

in

1981,

county,

a

cadre

Jiangsu

of

the

province,

business trip, heard of an outrageous incident.

women's

off

on a

Peasant woman

Chen Mei had a husband who was working away from home. Her
father-in-law and brother-in-law suspected her of improper
sexual conduct and beat her badly. They broke three of her
ribs and punctured a lung. They would not let Chen Mei go to
the hospital for treatment. They also persuaded a local cadre
to threaten her not to tell anyone, and they kept her schoolage child locked up at home.

Only on the third day,

when

someone from Chen's natal family arrived, did they send her to
the hospital.
When the Women's Federation cadre heard of this incident,
one of the members hurried to the hospital,

comforted Chen

Mei, and said to her, " The Women's Federation will back you
up."

This

cadre,

along

with

the

Party

Committee

and

the

Women's Federation of the commune, investigated the incident
and made arrangements for Chen Mei's medical treatment and a
place to live. The cadre immediately reported the incident to
the county Party Committee. The county Women's Federation and
the police conducted a joint investigation, and the assailants
were punished in accordance with the law. At the court session
where judgment was pronounced, the member of the cadre from
the county Women's Federation said, " The Women's Federation
speaks up for battered and abused women, and protects their
legal rights and interests" (Zhongguo Funu, Jan.1981:44).

~
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Although the movement to protect the

legal rights of

Chinese women still has a long way to go, the increased public
attention to a strong legal system and the various efforts
made to control gender violence are important steps in the
move to the final elimination of violence against women.

"FLOATING POPULATION"

Another phenomenon associated with the one-child-family
policy is rural women's joining the "floating" population with
their husbands (China Today, 1991).
place to place,

That is, they wander from

migrate to cities without proper residence

permits, and deliberately seek to avoid pressure to use birth
control because they want large families or want a son after
having had several daughters. There are three frequently used
patterns:
1.

The woman leaves her hometown with her husband shortly

after they get married. They live in one city or town for a
while and then move to another one. The husband does all kinds
of temporary jobs to support the family, while the wife stays
in their humble home,
fulfil

their

giving birth to children. After they

reproductive

plan,

they

return

to

their

hometown.
2. The couple already has a daughter, and wants a son. They
leave their young daughter in the care of her grandparents,
and wander wherever they can, until they give birth to a son.

~
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3. After a woman gets pregnant, she is sent to a relative's
home far from her own village. If the new-born is a son, she
will come back happily. Otherwise, she will leave the infant
girl with her relative, or simply desert her in order to come
back home and get pregnant again.
By "floating" they not only avoid the authorized "birth
quota", but also escape successfully the expensive fine for
giving birth to more than one child.
According to some statistics, the floating population has
risen to 50 million.

By 1989, it was said that:

Almost all of them (the floating population) have
at least two children; some even have three or
four. They buy grain and coal at negotiated prices,
do not have a permanent job, and do not belong to
any unit. They work hard to earn as much money as
they can, and they can have as many children as
they want. They form a social group that is
virtually subject to no one's jurisdiction and
thereby poses a serious threat to family planning
efforts (Aird, 1990).
These "floating" rural couples are very difficult for
government officials to follow and tabulate. And given the
difficulties

of

monitoring

this

group

and

effectively

implementing family planning, these couples have produced a
large number of over-large families. A 40-year-old farmer from
Hanyang district in Wuhan 15 has recently been found to have
eleven children, five boys and six girls (Deng, 1989). Eighty
rural

families

15

are

now

seeking

temporary

jobs

in

this

Wuhan is a large and important industrial city in
China. It is also the capital of Hunan Province, which is
located in southern China.
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district. These people already have two or more children, and
they have given birth to a further twenty children since their
arrival

(Deng,

1989).

A recent

million

babies

born

1987,

in

study

and

shows

1 million

that
in

some

3

1988 were

unauthorized third or fourth children. And around 2.5 million
people married

below the

legal

age,

putting

them

in the

position to give birth at a relatively early age (Hu, 1989).
Besides the extra burdens the "floating population" has
added to the country, the "floating" women have many problems
and difficulties. The most common one is that they cannot get
proper medical treatment during pregnancy and even during
delivery. As mentioned before, Chinese women are expected to
have official authorization to become pregnant. When they are
pregnant without permission, they are unable to get prenatal
care because they lack authorization papers to present to
local

health clinics

(Chen,

1985;

Weisskopf,

1985).

As

a

result, the "floating" mothers and their babies often suffer
from malnutrition, and the health of the new-born babies is
negatively affected.
Nevertheless,
join the

a number of rural women still prefer to

"floating population"

than to stay at home.

The

obvious reason is that they can have as many children as they
want. Meanwhile they can avoid the reproduction coercion from
the government.

,
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BIRTH CONTROL AND RURAL WOMEN

The fertility decline among rural women has been the
result of a determined and successful birth planning program.
And an inseparable part of the program is the prevailing use
of contraceptives in the countryside. Since the late 1970s,
various

contraceptive

instruments

have

been

gradually

introduced to the countryside, and more and more rural women
have started using them. Although considerable achievement has
been made, birth control in the countryside still has several
common problems which

affect rural women:

1. IUDs, abortions and sterilizations are the most common
contraceptives used in the rural areas. And the practice of
birth control is primarily considered to be the responsibility
of married women ---- a responsibility arising from their sex
role as bearers of children; it is women who get abortions; It
is

women who

sterilized.

use

IUDs,

and

it

is

usually women who

are

Under the one-child-family policy, rural families

show a greater preference for sterilizing a daughter-in-law
rather than a son.

Patriarchal families also prefer female

sterilization because they value men and do not want to put
them at risk. If things go on like this, husbands and in-laws
of sterilized women may press for divorce in order to try to

~

get grandsons by a second wife.

In fact,

already

strategy

applied

this

divorce

some people have
as

a

possible

I
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alternative if the first-born child is a girl. In addition,
some

sterilized

women

suffer

form

"sideaches"

(internal

infections) and lose their ability to work; some of them even
lose

their

(Dalsimera

lives

and

Nisonoff,

1987).

The

seriousness of the problem can be sensed by listening to Li
Lianxin's 16 concerns:

"What I'm most worried about is that

something may go wrong during the vas sterilization owing to
the poorly-equipped rural clinics," she says.

"No economic

compensation can counteract side effect or loss of life ... "
(Women of China, Sept.1989).
2. As previously mentioned, 53% of the rural women rely
on IUDs. And once a woman has had the IUD inserted,
unable,

she is

and does not have the freedom or right, to take it

out.
The most-widely used IUD in China is a modified Ota made
of stainless steel. rt has no string on it and, therefore, can
only be removed by a trained medical person with a fine metal
hook. Also, files on women's method of contraception are kept,
and women are required to receive regular examinations to make
sure

that

their

coils

are

in

place

and

no

"unplanned"

pregnancies have occurred. Usually, doctors and nurses are not
allowed

to

remove

IUDs

from

any

woman

without

official

authorization. Those who have done so without permission from
an associated birth-control official will be punished. In the

16

Li Lian-xin is a woman cadre member in Yuncheng County,
Shanxi Province.
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past few years, many cases have been published in newspapers
and

magazines,

criticizing

doctors

and

nurses

who

have

unofficially removed IUDs.
3. In some poor and remote areas, forced abortions are
still very common.
In theory,

the nationwide birth control programs have

made all contraceptive methods available to married couples.
In practice,

only the urban women have options to choose

different 'birth control methods,

and to get contraceptives

free from a nationwide contraceptive distribution network. In
some rural areas,

it is still difficult for women to get

contraceptive devices. And in some other areas, abortions are
the only available method for women.

Dalsimer and Nisonoff

in 1982 mentioned in their article that "extreme measures like
sequestration of pregnant women to convince them to abort and
arrests by Public Security officials, the women sometimes are
bound

and

transported

in

animal

cages,

followed

by

late

abortions" . 17 Even Peng Peiyun, minister of the State Family
Planning Commission, admitted that "some abortions on women in
the later stages of pregnancies do occur in remote areas"
(Beijing Review, Mar. 91, P29).
4. Handing out fines has proved to be useless in the past
few years.

17

Also see John Gittings, "Communes: New Directions or
Abandonment? China Now, No. 102 (May/June, 1982; and Aird in
particular, emphasizes the coercions of women which result
form the one-child-family policy.
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As previously mentioned, since 1979, there has been no
national law to guarantee the implementation of the one-childfamily policy. Therefore various local measures have come into
effect.

One of the most common methods of control

countryside
effective.

is

fining,

but

recently

it

has

in the

ceased to

be

In the first few years of the one-child-family

policy, parents of an unplanned second birth were fined 2,000
to 3,000 yuan (approximately a yearly salary of a university
professor) ,
peasants.

which

was

a

shocking

In the past few years,

figure

for

however,

most

of

the

because of the

responsibility system and economic reform, many getting-richquick farmers have emerged. These newly-rich farmers are not
at all afraid of being fined. (See Figure 3.)
As for the poor families, they simply open their doors to
the birth control workers and tell them to take whatever they
like

(Xiao

and

Chen,

1989).

To

these

poor

families,

the

potential labor productivity of sons can ultimately reduce
economic disincentives imposed by the government.
"The situation in the countryside is different from that
in the cities," Pei Yingping, a woman cadre member, says. "It
is true that the more sons you have, the quicker your family
becomes well-off. And no farmer does not wish to earn more
money as soon as possible" (Xiao & Yan, 1989).
One might ask: for whom are children born? Who wants more
children and who wants fewer and why? The interests of the
state and of private families are not necessarily the same;

'
69

nor are the

interests of the mother,

the father,

and the

grandparents the same. Women bear the burden of retribution
from the government when they bear an extra child,

and in

rural areas from their families when they bear a female child.
As Wolf states: " If a woman's husband and his family decide
that it is worth the economic risk, it is her body that must
conceal the

illegal pregnancy,

her body that will

be the

target of the cadre's anger if its quota is exceeded, her body
that will endure a forced abortion perhaps too late to be
entirely safe" (Wolf, 1985).

'I'
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•Don't be afraid, kids. Your dad has enough money to pay the fine." The sign says:
A fine will be Imposed for having extra children.
Chang Tieiun

Figure 3. Cartoon. Source: China
XXXVIII, No.7, July 1989, P31.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study is to explore the implications
of the one-child-family policy for

Chinese women.

Various

kinds of descriptive data have been applied to analyze the
positive and negative impacts of the policy on both urban and
rural women in China. The results of the study have confirmed
the two hypotheses advanced at the beginning of the thesis.
This study shows that since the implementation of the
one-child-family policy, Chinese women's age at first marriage
has increased; years women spend in childbearing and child
rearing have decreased; the percent of women of childbearing
age who use contraceptives has increased.
This study also shows that urban women are more willing
to accept this government policy because they benefit more
from the policy than their rural counterparts. For example,
since the implementation of the one-child-family policy, there
has been a great increase in social services and medical care
programs for young mothers in the cities. The reduced number
of years spent on childbearing and child rearing has enabled
urban women to participate in their education improvement,
working outside home, and various social movements. Above all,

~
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urban women's attitude toward the gender of the only child has
changed. To many women now, a baby girl is as acceptable as a
baby boy.
Compared with urban women, rural women in China seem to
be negatively affected by the one-child-family policy more
than they are compatible with it. Instead of getting all the
benefits urban women have received from the one-child-family
policy, rural women's labor, social, health, and family status
has been negatively affected:
wife-beating

and

female infanticide reappears;

wife-abandonment

population" emerges.

increase;

"floating

The thesis also discusses the birth-

control problems with rural women and the pressure they feel
from their families' desire of having sons.
The findings of this study show that so long as the onechild-family policy remains,

the differential responses of

rural and urban women are likely to remain. So long as rural
women's personal goals remain unfulfilled, the problem will
continue.
The findings of the study also reveal a very serious
problem with the one-child-family in rural China.

That is,

although the policy reduces China's population rapidly,
damages

rural

women's

lives.

Furthermore,

it

will

it

surely

damage the future generations of all Chinese women, especially
rural women if the policy is extended into future decades.
According to .some reports, Chinese government plans to
carry on the one-child-family policy for another ninety years

•
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in order to reduce the total population to the ideal number
-

700 million.

NINETY YEARS!

What will happen to China's

females ninety years later if the current problems remain?
This and many other problems definitely need to be further
tackled and studied. But one thing is clear: the one-childfamily

policy

is

not

the

best

solution to

raise

Chinese

women's status or to protect women. To me, the policy can only
be regarded as a kind of "transitional resolution" (one of the
conflict

resolutions

offered

by

conflict

theorists

in

sociology) . It will not lead to permanent termination of the
current

population

facilitate

problems

temporary

China

reduction

so

has

now,

that

but

more

it

does

permanent

conciliatory structures and solutions may be developed and
maintained.

•
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APPENDIX

The following is a list of conditions that enables any
couple whether urban or rural to apply for permission to have
a second child (Davin, 1985).
1. The first child suffers from a medically-certificated,
nonhereditary disability and is not expected to grow up
to be an able-bodied laborer.
2. One spouse has a child by a previous marriage but the
other does not.
3. A couple believed to be infertile adopt a child after
years of marriage and the woman subsequently becomes
pregnant.
4. Both spouses are of minority nationality.
5. Both spouses are overseas Chinese who have returned
from abroad.
Some rural areas have different conditions. The following
is the set of conditions issued by Shanxi province in 1982,
providing an interesting range of exceptions. 18
1.

The husband has settled in the home of his wife's

parents and she is an only child.

18

See "Shanxi Planned Parenthood Regulations",
Ribao, September,17, 1982.

Shanxi
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2.

They

live

in sparsely populated mountain villages

disadvantaged both in terms of transport and natural
conditions.
3. The husband is the only one among three brothers to be
capable of fathering a child.
4.The husband is the only son of someone who died for the
revolution.
5. One spouse has a major disability.
6. The family has had only one son in a generation for
three consecutive generations.
7. Both spouses are themselves only children.

